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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to verify if companies of economically regulated markets are dis-
couraged to invest in research and development (R&D). Panel data analysis has been performed 
on a sample of 55 companies listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange (B3), which published in-
formation on the amounts allocated to Research and Development (R&D) activities. The sample 
period comprises the years 2009 to 2014. Results show that regulation did not reach statistical 
significance in relation to the level of expenditure on R&D. However, we confirm the effects of 
certain characteristics of companies, such as size and performance, on R&D activities. These 
results may contribute to the formulation of public policies aiming at economic development.
Keywords: regulation, innovation, research and development, Brazilian Stock Exchange (B3).
RESUMO
O objetivo deste artigo é verificar se as empresas de mercados economicamente regulados são 
desestimuladas a investir em pesquisa e desenvolvimento (P&D). A análise de dados de painel 
foi realizada em uma amostra de 55 empresas listadas na Bolsa Brasileira (B3), que publicaram 
informações sobre os montantes alocados às atividades de P&D. O período amostral compre-
ende os anos de 2009 a 2014. Os resultados mostram que a regulação não atingiu significân-
cia estatística em relação ao nível de despesa em P&D. Contudo, confirmamos os efeitos de 
determinadas características das empresas, tais como tamanho e desempenho, em atividades 
de P&D. Esses resultados podem contribuir para a formulação de políticas públicas voltadas ao 
desenvolvimento econômico.
Palavras-chave: regulação, inovação, pesquisa e desenvolvimento, Bolsa Brasileira (B3).
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, economic regulation has been justified by 
the State’s need to preserve and secure the interests of society. 
In this sense, the regulation is considered imperative to protect 
and benefit the public, due to the existence of market failures 
(Pinheiro, 2015). Therefore, regulation is seen by public interest 
theory as a social claim that has been mitigating the suffering of 
the people against the abuse of modern organizations and acting 
as a defense of the general interest mechanism (Lima, 2005).
However, based on empirical and critical studies, which 
have argued that regulation is often responsible for the benefit 
of regulated organizations rather than society, Stigler (1971) 
proposed the basis of the Theory of Economic Regulation (TER). 
For the author, the main purpose of TER is to explain and un-
derstand the benefits of regulation, how they occur and what 
their effects are. In addition, it justifies the existence of natural 
monopolies and oligopolies, as they allow the use of economies 
of scale for higher performance and lower costs (Stigler, 1971).
Thus, the infrastructure sectors such as electricity, tele-
communication, transport, among others, are presented as 
natural oligopolies under the aegis of production efficiency. 
According to Levy and Spiller (1993), with the passage of 
time, efficient management practices may be discouraged in 
natural monopoly or oligopoly, due to the absence (or low) 
competition. For these authors, with the purpose of rescuing 
the incentives for good management practices and supporting 
the efficient production that emerges a regulatory framework. 
In the designing of Pires and Piccinini (1999), the regulation 
would also have the role of encouraging innovation.  
In Brazil, R&D investment in the electricity sector, for 
example, is an obligation defined by Law No. 9.991, of 2000 
(Brasil, 2000), as amended by Law No. 10.848 in 2004 (Brasil, 
2004), and Law No. 11.465 in 2007 (Brasil, 2007), which provide 
for participation in R&D and energy efficiency by concession-
aires, vested investors and licensees in the electricity sector 
- and is regulated by the corresponding decrees (Ziviani and 
Ferreira, 2016). Since then, this sector has applied hundreds 
yearly of millions of Reais in R&D. 
From this point of view, the major regulatory challenge is 
the issue of producer profitability, concomitant with consumer 
welfare, translated into quality goods and services at reason-
able prices (Levy and Spiller, 1993). Such efforts must, however, 
be aligned with the innovation activities already taking place 
in the regulated sectors.
According to Freeman and Soete (2014, p. 26), who are 
based on Schumpeterian thinking, when we think of innovation 
we must distinguish between it and invention. Although an 
invention is an idea, model, or abstract structure for a new or 
improved device, product, process, or system, it is not respon-
sible for technological innovation. However, innovation is only 
complete in an economic way when the first commercial trans-
action involving the new product, process or system occurs. 
Innovation is also, in Schumpeter’s (1982) view, the 
driving force of entrepreneurial activity and, without the 
application of innovation by entrepreneurial activity, there 
would be no economic development. This argument holds true 
for the changes faced by industry in the twentieth century, 
such as vertical integration, and product differentiation and 
diversification. Innovation, therefore, is shown as a business 
competitiveness strategy.
Porter and Van der Linde (1995) developing the idea of 
environment-competitiveness argue that such “innovation 
offsets” can not only lower the net cost of meeting environ-
mental regulations but can even lead to absolute advantages 
over firms in foreign countries not subject to similar regula-
tions. According to their idea, firms can benefit from properly 
crafted environmental regulations that are more stringent (or 
are imposed earlier) than those faced by their competitors in 
other countries. By stimulating innovation, strict environmental 
regulations can enhance competitiveness (Porter and Van der 
Linde, 1995, p. 101).
Some agree also that monopolistic structures tend to 
be more innovative than perfect competition ones, because to 
ensure their market position monopolistic companies need to 
innovate (Dosi, 2006). In his view, successful innovation would 
lead to extraordinary profits and difficult imitation.
On the other hand, the Schumpeterian theory also recom-
mends that stimulating innovation is not present in monopoly 
or natural oligopoly, as companies belonging to these structures 
are the only producers of goods or services and therefore incur 
high irrecoverable costs. Moreover, these firms submit to gov-
ernment regulatory action without a competitive environment, 
which may inhibit investments in innovative activities.
Similarly, Rothwell (1981) places the regulation as an 
element of uncertainty concerning the operations of innova-
tive entrepreneurs. Sometimes this involves rapid or obscure 
changes in regulatory standards and expenditures generated 
to cover the costs of compliance with regulation. The solution 
to this problem would be to reduce the tendency to take risks 
(Manners and Mason, 1979), which inevitably would lead to 
a decrease in spending on R&D, which is considered one of 
innovation inputs.
Given this context, we note that economic regulation, 
although active in ensuring goods and services that satisfy the 
society may end up discouraging investment in innovation. In this 
context, this article proposes the following question: Does mar-
ket regulation affects the level of resources allocated to R&D? 
To answer the proposed question, we define the following 
specific objectives: (a) identify the companies that make up 
the sample; (b) gather the economic and financial informa-
tion of companies, and (c) verify the effects of regulation on 
the level of spending on R&D based on the application of an 
econometric model.
Research on the effects of regulation on innovation has 
indicated that a more rigorous economic regulation tends to 
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hinder innovative activities (Pelkmans and Renda, 2014). How-
ever, according to Sav (1977), different cases were analyzed by 
dividing the businesses between regulated and unregulated. He 
found that a stricter regulation would reduce the R&D activities 
of regulated firms compared to those inserted in unregulated 
environments, ceteris paribus. In addition, Rothwell (1981) 
warns that firms submitted to regulation innovate less, making 
room for the supplier firms of goods and services to innovate 
more. This positive effect of innovation on unregulated sectors 
was also found in Ledezma (2009). Finally, Stewart (2010) em-
phasizes that the regulation may affect positively or negatively 
on R&D activities, varying according to the specific cases.
This paper focuses on the effects of regulation on R&D 
investment and is justified by the need to effectively subsidize 
policies that stimulate economic development. It takes into ac-
count the application of intellectual property rights and incentives 
to economic agents who innovate (Dosi, 2006). At the same time, 
it should be noted that research on regulation and its relationship 
with innovation still deserves attention on the national scene. 
Therefore, this article may contribute to the literature in the field, 
mainly by focusing a subject not well explored.
In order to respond to the proposed research problem 
and bring theoretical and practical contributions, this article 
is divided into five sections: the introduction, theoretical 
framework, adopted methodological procedures, discussion of 
the results, and reflection on the proposed objective as well as 
suggestions for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review presents the topic of economic 
regulation in Brazil and explores innovation. 
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN BRAZIL
Economic regulation can be understood as a state action 
limiting the freedom of economic agents to carry out their 
activities and requiring them to contribute to the state func-
tion of promoting social welfare (Stigler, 1971). According to 
Fiani (1998), this limitation is materialized by means of price 
control (tariffs), the quantity and quality of products, and 
service and investment goals.
In this sense, Scherer and Ross (1990) stated that regu-
lation is directed primarily to the public utilities sector. It is 
justified mainly by two concepts: the first is the idea that the 
size of the company is so large in comparison to its market 
that the competition fails as a price, quantity, and quality 
disciplinarian. The second refers to the fact that even if the 
market is functioning properly, the political power holders may, 
for some reason, be dissatisfied with the results achieved by 
certain sectors of industry.
In Brazil, economic regulation can be analyzed from two 
distinct periods: the 1970s and the 1990s. In the 1970s, the 
development policy focused on state-owned enterprises and 
investment programs in the public sector, mainly in strategic 
fields such as oil and telecommunications (Matias-Pereira, 
2004). Therefore, the regulatory action of the State was based 
on the protection of domestic industry. Unlike in the 1970s, 
the 1990s were characterized by economic liberalization initi-
ated by President Fernando Collor de Melo, through programs 
such as industrial policy, foreign trade (ECIP), and the National 
Privatization Program (PND) (Guimarães, 1996). Thus, regula-
tory policy turned to the defense of competition.
The New Public Management (NPM) was introduced 
in the public scenario of Brazil as an advance towards de-
mocratization, social participation, and state management, 
representing social innovation (Beinare and McCarthy, 2011). 
Campos and Camacho (2014) revealed that the Brazilian oil 
sector during the 90s underwent a significant change in func-
tion, relaxing the previous state monopoly and allowing the 
entry of private and state companies for the development of 
the entire oil production process. Their results showed that 
the different market structures present in the oil industry led 
to certain inefficiencies, resulting in social costs and, conse-
quently, a loss of well-being for consumers.
This transformation of the Brazilian economy originated 
in the Federal Constitution of 1988, Art. 170, which resulted in 
a free market economy authoritative the value of human labor 
and free enterprise (Brasil, 1988). Subsequently, the enactment 
of Law No. 8.884 (Brasil, 1994) contributed to the consolida-
tion of the state as a regulator. This legal provision, responsible 
for the repeal of Law No. 4.137 (Brasil, 1962), dealt with the 
prevention and repression of violations of the economic order 
and lifted the Administrative Council for Economic Defense 
(CADE) to federal agency status, giving it greater managerial 
autonomy. Currently in force is Law No. 12.529 (Brasil, 2011), 
which established a real structure antitrust: the Brazilian 
System of Competition Defense (SBDC).
The main idea of this change was an extension of the 
public sector involving change in social values at the institu-
tional level, such as the citizenship and social inclusion. This 
involved the integration of new actors in decision making and 
implementation of public actions at the organizational level 
(Klering and Andrade, 2006).
However, one should remember that the application 
of this legislation was only intended for antitrust advice 
and to give regulatory agencies the function of evaluating 
and setting tariffs on the quantity and quality of goods or 
services (Teixeira, 2011). With this reasoning, Martins (2003) 
highlighted the operational difficulties faced by government 
agencies in exercising essential regulatory activities, such as 
regulation and supervision, which would involve the need to 
obtain autonomy and differentiated flexibility. Thus, regulatory 
agencies were created.
The adoption of the regulatory model, according to Pó 
and Abrucio (2006), took place during the first administration 
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of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and was divided into three 
stages. The first, from 1996 to 1997, involved the creation of 
regulatory agencies relating to the privatization and monopoly 
break of the infrastructure sector, namely: the National Electric 
Energy Agency (ANEEL), the National Agency Telecommunica-
tions (ANATEL), and the National Petroleum Agency (ANP).
Between 1999 and 2000, which constituted the second 
stage, the Brazilian federal government focused on the ef-
ficiency and modernization of the state, especially regarding 
the social interests of citizens. In this context, the National 
Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) and the National Health 
Agency (ANS) were instituted.
In the final stage, from 2001 to 2002, the National 
Agency for Land Transport (ANTT), the National Agency of 
Waterway Transportation (ANTAQ), the National Water Agency 
(ANA), and the National Cinema Agency (ANCINE) were created. 
In 2005, under the governance of President Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva, the Brazilian National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) 
was created by Law No. 11.182 (Brasil, 2005).
INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC 
REGULATION GOVERNMENT
Economic development requires change and leaving 
behind the status quo. According to Schumpeter (1982), this 
change requires innovation, which is achieved through the 
introduction of a new product in the market, origination of 
new productive combinations, and/or changes in production 
functions. Thus, we can learn that the act of innovation involves 
a complex process, and the creation of new products and/or 
technology is only one part of it. Similarly, Muniz and Plonski 
(2000) claimed that innovation is a social process in which the 
diffusion, imitation, improvement, and discovery of marketing 
are integral elements.
Dosi (2006) explained the capacity for innovation and 
market structures and established the following pattern. (1) 
Market structures and firm sizes are endogenous variables, 
which depend on the nature and rate of technical progress. 
(2) Major technological opportunities and high levels of pri-
vate appropriability generate large companies and cause high 
levels of concentration. (3) A company is likely large because 
it has been successful in its cumulative innovation activity. If 
there are many technological opportunities, its competitive 
advantage over the other businesses will be considerable, 
resulting in greater participation and higher levels of market 
concentration. (4) Concentration and market power, as well as 
technological developments, influence the current incentives 
for innovation, as they affect appropriability of innovations. 
This, in turn, is directly related to participation in the company’s 
market and the concentration of the industrial sector, as well 
as oligopolistic rivalry standards (Dosi, 2006, p. 142).
Innovation is a risky activity for organizations, and 
regulation can be an element that enhances this problem. 
According to Rothwell (1981), regulation implies uncertainty 
derived from various sources, such as inadequate changes in 
regulatory standards and inconsistencies between national 
and international standards. Thus, one of the consequences 
of regulation is the reduction of risks and uncertainties 
through the reduction of R&D activities (Manners and 
Mason, 1979).
The issue of cash flow of the companies belonging to the 
regulated sectors is noteworthy. The delay between the rate 
increase request and the authorization granted by the regulator 
can generate financial inconveniences for industries. Therefore, 
the reduction in spending on R&D would be a natural result 
(Rothwell, 1981).
The information regarding the financial sacrifices made 
for R&D is even one of the ways to measure innovation, as it 
represents a company’s input. This measure has been seen as 
an indicator of technological progressiveness for companies, 
industries, or nations (Cohen and Kepler, 1996). Jones and Wil-
liams (2000), in a broader view, claimed that spending on R&D 
is crucial to the productivity and well-being of the company 
and consumers. The fact is that the level of spending on R&D 
has been used worldwide to evaluate the technological level 
of the agents and, consequently, their innovation activities.
The study by Sav (1977) demonstrated that U.S. power 
companies invested less in R&D when inserted into a strict 
regulatory environment. The rationale would be that regu-
lated firm managers have less incentive to innovate because 
the wealth generated by the innovation would not maximize 
its usefulness. Regarding this issue, Sterlacchini (2012) 
more recently discovered some interesting results about 
the processes of liberalization and privatization. According 
to his finding, the last two decades have witnessed a stag-
gering decline of R&D investment in the fields of energy 
and electricity. A closer inspection of recent data concerned 
with ten major electric companies in the world showed that 
the drop in research expenditures was particularly strong 
among private or newly-privatized companies. In contrast, 
those that remained under public control did not remarkably 
reduce their R&D efforts.
Bassanini and Ernst (2002) investigated the effects of 
labor market regulation on innovation in 18 countries in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). They found positive evidence of association between 
the flexibility of the labor market and the level of spending on 
R&D in low-tech industries and countries whose industries are 
not coordinated. The reverse was found, however, in countries 
where the market is more regulated because the association 
between variables was negative.
The research by Prieger (2002) examined the effects of 
regulation on innovation and services in the telecommunica-
tions sector in the U.S. The econometric model tested showed 
evidence that, in general, companies added 62% more services 
in the market if there were no regulations in their industry. 
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Therefore, regulation exerted negative impacts on industry 
innovation services.
Ledezma (2009) studied 14 OECD countries from 1987-
2003 and found a positive effect between market regulation 
and R&D of high-tech industries. This result confirmed the as-
sumption by Rothwell (1981), who proposed that the regulated 
sector supports compliance to regulatory costs, which results 
in less investing in R&D, whereas the supplier industry reaps 
the benefits of the market and innovates through products 
and/or processes.
Eger and Mählich (2014) studied the relationship be-
tween regulation and the level of expenditure on R&D; however, 
they focused on the pharmaceutical industry. Unlike other 
surveys, they used financial variables such as cash flow and 
financial leverage in the model. As a result, they concluded 
that regulation deteriorates incentives for the pharmaceutical 
industry to invest in R&D.
That being said, there are reasons to believe that eco-
nomic market regulation also constitutes an important element 
of investment in R&D by companies established in Brazil. Based 
on the liberalization process and regulation agencies that were 
created, we proposed to test the hypothesis that economically-
regulated companies tend to spend fewer resources on R&D 
activities (Sav, 1977; Prieger, 2002; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008; 
Eger and Mählich, 2014). 
METHODOLOGY
This study is characterized as descriptive in relation to its 
objectives; pure with respect to the nature of their problem; 
quantitative regarding the problem and laboratory approach to 
its environment. As for technical procedures, it is bibliographi-
cal and documentary.
The population covers publicly traded companies listed on 
the B3. Of this population, the sample was extracted from the 
non-probabilistic type, which brought together 55 companies. 
Came to this number from query to the database Bloomberg® 
combined with examination of the Standardized Financial 
Statements (SFS) filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (CVM). Thus, the sample included companies that have 
reported data for the expenditure on R&D from 2009 to 2014.
Overall, the financial data were collected on Bloomberg® 
base and the DFPs companies. Data on the age of the firms 
have been achieved through consultation with the National 
Register of Legal Entities (CNPJ) available on the IRS Web 
site of Brazil. Already the numbers of CNPJs companies were 
obtained through the homepage of the B3.
The hypothesis examined in this study was formulated 
based on the economic theory of regulation and on the results 
of previous research. Thus, one has:
H1: Economically regulated companies tend to spend 
fewer resources on R&D activities.
In order to test this hypothesis, we used multiple linear 
regression with panel data, since the combination of time series 
with cross-sections was appropriate to the research problem. 
Thus, the data on 330 observations obtained were tabulated 
in Excel® software and then imported into Stata® statistical 
software, version 12, which were duly organized in balanced 
and treated panels.
The econometric model tested is shown in Equation 1:
SpendR&D = β0 + β1Sizeit + β2Perforit + β3Levit + β4Ageit + β5 
Regit + β6ESit + β7ITSit + uit + εit (1)
where SpendR&D is spending on R&D, Sizeit is size of 
companies, Perforit is performance of companies, Levit is level 
of financial leverage of companies, Ageit is formal existence 
of time the company, Regit is economic regulation expressed 
by a Regulator Agency, ESit is electric sector companies’, ITSit 
is information technology sector companies’. 
The dependent variable is intended to express the level 
of spending on research and development in companies and 
is calculated using the ratio of expenditure on R&D and total 
assets. This measure is recurrent in research aimed at R&D 
activities of companies (see Abdullah et al., 2002; Tribo et al., 
2007; Di Vito et al., 2010).
The variable Size is intended to express the size of the 
companies, using up to this, the data relating to total assets. 
It is expected that this variable presents a negative associa-
tion with the level of spending on R&D. We follow Levy and 
Spiller (1993) who consider that, as the time passes, efficient 
management practices may be discouraged in large companies 
as well in concentrated market.
The ratio of net income and total assets aims to demon-
strate the performance of companies, which is represented by 
Perform variable. Pending a positive relationship between it and 
the SpendR&D variable, as companies with good performance 
are favorable conditions to invest in R&D.
Another independent variable is Lev, which sets the 
level of financial leverage of companies. This variable was 
constructed based on the ratio of the required subject and 
the net worth of companies. It is expected that its coeffi-
cient is negative, since the lesser degree of leverage allows 
for free resources for application which, in turn, can be used 
for R&D activities.
Also included in the model, the variable Age intends 
to capture the effect of the formal existence of time the 
company on the level of spending on R&D. It is believed that 
ancient firms in the market tend to invest less in research and 
development, which is why a negative coefficient is expected 
(Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009).
The economic regulation expressed through the dummy 
Reg variable has the following values: 1 to member companies 
of economically regulated industries by the government and 
0 for others. This variable was based in the fact that there 
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were created or not specific Regulation Agency for the sector, 
as we have presented in the first section of Literature review. 
A negative coefficient is expected for this variable.
The variable ES intends to control the effect that electric 
companies in the sector may cause the results. This dummy 
has value 1 to companies operating in the electricity sector 
and 0 for others. The concern with this sector is justified by 
the legal requirement that electric companies have to invest 
a portion of its net operating revenue in R&D activities (Law 
No. 9.991/2000).
Finally, the ITS variable attempts to control the impact of 
the information technology (IT) sector may cause, for this field 
of activity, by nature, tend to invest heavily in R&D. In order 
to be a categorical variable, it shows the value 1 to companies 
belonging to the IT industry and 0 for others.
DISCUSSION
The sample, as already mentioned, was composed of 55 
companies listed on the B3, distributed in economic sectors 
as shown in Figure 1.
Among all analyzed companies, those operating in 
the utility sector predominated, accounting for 50.91% of 
the total. Of these, 27, or approximately 49%, are in the 
electricity subsector. The large share of this subsector in 
the sample is due to the Law No. 9.991 passed in July 24, 
2000. Article 1 of that statute requires concessionaires and 
licensees of public electricity services to implement annu-
ally the minimum amount of 0.75% of their net operating 
revenue in R&D activities (Law no. 9.991/2000). Therefore, 
companies in this subsector need to report this information 
on their financial statements.
The sector of industrial goods, with nine companies, rep-
resents 16.36% of the total. This sector is responsible for the 
production of goods for other industrial sectors and, therefore, 
plays a prominent role in the dissemination of technology, 
which justifies its relevance in the sample.
The third most representative sector in the sample was 
Information Technology, which notoriously has as main feature 
the creation of solutions and systems for individuals and orga-
nizations. Thus, this sector has the need to allocate resources 
for research and development of new products.
Figure 2 shows the level of spending on R&D as a percent-
age, as well as their average per economic sector.
For the years 2009 and 2010, it can be observed that the 
industrial goods and information technology sectors spent the 
most on R&D resources, with 86.83% and 6.21% of shares in 
2009 and 85.20% and 7.40% in 2010, respectively. From 2011 
onwards, the technology sector took the lead in R&D spending, 
with 44.18%, 40.85%, 38.83%, and 36.85% during this period, 
while the industrial goods sector ranked second by 2013, with 
21.90%, 24.17%, and 25.78%. In 2014, the consumer discre-
tionary sector took the second position with 27.74%.
Regarding the level of spending on R&D, it can be 
observed that the public utility sector, which had the largest 
number of companies, was only fourth in spending by the year 
2011, jumping to third in 2012. Their average level of spending 
on R&D was 10.86%, which places it as the third company with 
the most investments in R&D.
The companies showed average total assets of R$24.8 
billion, with a minimum value of R$47 million and a maxi-
mum of R$793 billion. The minimum value corresponded to 
an electric company in the year 2014, and the maximum 
value referred to the only firm in the oil, gas, and biofuels 
sector, also in 2014. This variation shows the large difference 
between the sizes of the companies studied, but it can also 
be explained by the sectors involved, according to Thom-
son Reuters’ 2015 State of Innovation in the world report 
(Thomson Reuters, 2015). While our study used expenses 
in financial reports as a measure of R&D investments, the 
Figure 1. Number of sample enterprises by economic sector.
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Thomson Reuters’ (2015) report examined patent-filing as a 
concrete measurement of innovation. This report showed that 
of more than 1.2 million patents filed across 12 industries 
in 2014, 30% were in the information technology industry, 
a far greater chunk than any other industry. Another 13% 
were related to telecommunications, 12% were automotive, 
and oil and gas had only 2%.
The Lev variable reached its peak in 2013 with a company 
in the industrial goods sector. In this case, its total liabilities 
represented 53.22% of its shareholder’s equity. The “within” 
variation was higher than the “between” variation, which 
means that this index had a greater change over time.
The Perform variable, responsible for estimating the per-
formance of companies, obtained greater variability over time 
for each individual than the variation between the companies 
themselves. Its maximum value, 0.96, was obtained by an 
electric corporation in 2009 and is considered a great mark. 
On the other hand, its minimum value, -1.90, indicates a poor 
result, and this value was also earned by an electric firm, this 
time in 2012. In fact, these -1.90 result was caused by a net 
loss of R$797 million. Although the average performance was 
.042, we cannot confirm that companies had poor performance 
on average because our sample is composed of very different 
sectors and is distributed over 6 years.
With respect to the age of the firms, the oldest company 
is 62 years old. This firm belongs to the public utility sector, 
specifically the electricity subsector. In turn, the youngest 
enterprises were legally formalized 3 years ago. On average, 
the enterprises are about 30 years old.
Regarding the multivariate analysis of the data, the first 
step was to verify the normal distribution of the error term. 
Therefore, we analyzed the indicative of skewness and kurtosis 
of all the variables, and the results showed that the data did 
not present a normal distribution. Therefore, we proceeded 
with the transformation of the variables by applying a natural 
logarithm. After this change, the problem of non-normality 
was fixed. However, the consequence of this transformation 
was that the coefficients of the variables began to express 
the elasticities of the dependent variable, SpendR&D. The 
econometric model is represented by Equation 2:
lnSpendR&Dit = β0 + β1lnSizeit + β2lnPerformit + β3lnLevit + β4 
lnAgeit + β5Regit + β6ESit + β7ITSit + uit + εitt (2)
Then, in order to make sure that the model did not present 
strong multicollinearity problem, we consulted the correlation 
matrix between the variables as showed in Table 2.
Table 2 demonstrates that there was no strong cor-
relation between the independent variables. Even the highest 
coefficient of correlation, perceived between the variables lnLev 
and ITS, indicate a weak correlation, resulting in the negative 
value of 0.2882.
Once we examined the basic assumptions of the regres-
sion model, we run the multiple regression analysis with panel 
Figure 2. Spend on R&D by economic sector, from 2009 to 2014.
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data (PDA). Then, we performed the Hausman and Breusch-
Pagan tests to identify the most suitable model. The results 
pointed to the random effects model. Table 3 shows the output 
obtained using this model.
First, the discussion will be focused on the biggest aim of 
this paper: the relationship between economic regulation and 
the spending on R&D by the firms. Therefore, with the use of the 
dummy variable Reg, we found that market regulation did not 
significantly influence the level of spending on R&D (p = 0.908), 
which means that there is no evidence for accepting. In addi-
tion, its coefficient was positive, contrary to what was expected. 
Therefore, it is not possible to claim that economic regulation, 
in the context of this research, was a factor that discouraged 
investments in the innovation input R&D. In some of the sectors, 
this result may be explained by strict environmental regulations, 
which can enhance competitiveness and encourage investments, 
stimulating innovation (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995, p. 101).
This result is contrary to the assumption by Rothwell 
(1981), who stated that the regulated sector supports compli-
ance to regulatory costs, resulting in less investment in R&D. 
However, after discovering these results, we investigated the 
Innovation Survey (IBGE, 2016) in Brazil. It is a research sur-
vey conducted every 3 years, covering the sectors of industry, 
services, electricity, and gas. This survey gathers information 
regarding the construction of national indicators on the activi-
ties of innovation undertaken by Brazilian companies.
The latest available research data from IBGE (2016) is 
from the year 2014, and it shows an interesting result: 74.83% 
of organizations that received investments by government 
support programs related that innovation was possible due to 
financing received for the purchase of machinery and equip-
ment needed to innovate. This can lead to new research that 
compares the reasons for innovation by country. Also, it is a 
result that is congruent with Dosi’s (2006) explanation of how 
Japan was able to improve its technological and automotive 
sector thanks to governmental support.
Concerning to the effect of a company’s size on the level 
of spending on R&D, we can see in Table 3 that the variable 
lnSize was statistically significant (p < .01), with a negative 
coefficient. Therefore, we can infer that this relationship is 
inversely proportional to the level of expenditure on R&D: the 
larger the size of the company, the lower its tendency to incur 
expenditures on R&D. This result confirms the postulation by 
Schumpeter (1982).
Variables lnSpendR&D lnSize lnLev lnPerform lnAge Reg ES ITS
lnSpendR&D 1.0000    
lnSize -0.4605 1.0000    
lnLev -0.1455 0.2211 1.0000   
lnPerform 0.1662 -0.2287 -0.1264 1.0000   
lnAge 0.0403 0.2293 0.0269 -0.0772 1.0000  
Reg -0.4160 0.1787 0.0986 0.1298 -0.3401 1.0000  
ES -0.4253 0.0496 0.0760 0.1492 -0.2464 0.7790 1.0000
ITS 0.4026 -0.2528 -0.2882 -0.0590 0.0061 -0.3538 -0.2756 1.0000
Table 2. Correlation matrix between variables.
lnSpendR&D Coefficient Standard error z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
lnSize -.2718602 .0797821 -3.41 0.001 -.4282302 -.1154902
lnLev -.2080209 .11642 -1.79 0.074 -.4361998 .0201581
lnPerform .1456655 .0378674 3.85 0.000 .0714469 .2198842
lnAge .2652244 .1714171 1.55 0.122 -.0707469 .6011957
Reg .0614946 .5323739 0.12 0.908 -.9819391 1.104.928
ES -1.011.727 .4930666 -2.05 0.040 -197.812 -.0453341
ITS 1.154.768 .609734 1.89 0.058 -.0402882 2.349.825
_const .6528169 1.669.859 0.39 0.696 -2.620.047 3.925.681
Table 3. Estimation of panel regression model with random effects.
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The variable lnLev, referring to the level of financial le-
verage, had a negative coefficient, the same as that achieved 
by Eger and Mählich (2014). However, with a p value of 0.074, 
we could not confirm the statistical significance at a 95% 
confidence level. Therefore, it is not possible to state that lnLev 
exerts effects on the level of spending on R&D.
The variable lnPerform showed a positive coefficient, as 
expected, and this was also statistically significant (p < .01). 
Consequently, there is evidence to suggest that the better the 
performance of the organization, the more likely it to invest 
in R&D.
Regarding the variable lnAge, this was not statistically 
significant, given its p value of 0.122. Thus, the age of a 
company does not have any significant impact on the level of 
spending on R&D.
Concerning the ES control variable, the dummy repre-
sentative of the electricity sector, it had an inverse relation 
with the level of expenditure on R&D. Thus, it is understood 
that the presence of legal enforcement in this sector to apply 
part of its revenue in R&D does not cause electric companies 
to invest more in R&D than they would have otherwise.
The TIS control variable, likewise, was statistically insig-
nificant (p > .05). Thus, it is not possible to say that companies 
belonging to the IT sector, although mainly focused on creat-
ing systems and solutions, are more likely to invest in R&D 
activities.
One point that cannot be overlooked, however, is the 
question of examination of other basic assumptions of regres-
sion, which could only be analyzed after the model was tested. 
This time, problems regarding the autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity were checked. For this, we used the Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation, which showed the presence of the 
anomaly. Therefore, we opted for the robust estimate of regres-
sion, which generated the results presented in Table 4.
Thus, we opted for a robust regression estimation, which 
generated the results presented in Table 4.
Regarding the permanency of statistical significance, 
the results achieved by the robust standard error estimation 
coincided with the OLS estimation. The lnSize variable had a 
small change in its value, from 0.001 to 0.014, which did not 
affect the previous analysis.
Likewise, the lnPerform variable changed from 0.000 to 
0.001. Thus, performance presented a directly proportional 
relationship to the level of spending on R&D.
However, the ES control variable failed to achieve sta-
tistical significance at a level of 5%, as its new p-value was 
0.062. Hence, the results offered by Table 4 are more suitable 
due to its robust estimation and, consequently, we infer that 
the electrical subsector has no effect on the level of spending 
on R&D.
CONCLUSION
Innovation is a broad field of scientific research, so 
many studies have been conducted in the field, dedicated 
mainly to the analysis of its determinants. Similarly, research 
on the regulation of economic sectors is frequent. The rela-
tionship between innovation, measured by the level of R&D 
spending and market regulation, is becoming more popular, 
albeit latently on the international scene. Therefore, financial 
and economic variables such as total assets, performance, 
leverage, export and growth rates have been used to explain 
R&D expenditures.
The Theory of Economic Regulation (TER) holds that 
market regulations impose high costs on businesses, forcing 
them to allocate resources in legally established activities at 
the expense of those related to innovation. Thus, a negative 
effect of regulation on R&D is expected.
In this sense, this article focused on the analysis of the 
relationship between economically regulated industries and 
the level of spending on R&D. It was based on a sample of 
companies listed on B3 for the period from 2009 to 2014, and 
lnINT Coefficient
Robust 
z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Coefficient Standard Error
lnSize -.2718602 .1106308 -2.46 0.014 -.4886926 -.0550278
lnLev -.2080209 .2362168 -0.88 0.379 -.6709972 .2549555
lnPerform .1456655 .0456617 3.19 0.001 .0561702 .2351609
lnAge .2652244 .2282488 1.16 0.245 -.182135 .7125838
Reg .0614946 .6533943 0.09 0.925 -1.219.135 1.342.124
ES -1.011.727 .5430962 -1.86 0.062 -2.076.176 .0527221
ITS 1.154.768 .6241562 1.85 0.064 -.0685552 2.378.092
cons 1.669.859 2.242.853 0.29 0.771 -3.743.095 5.048.728
Table 4. Estimation of panel regression model with random effects (Robust).
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it included companies in the Standardized Financial Demon-
strations, which contains information on R&D expenditures.
The descriptive analysis of the data allowed us to observe 
that, on average, the industrial goods sector allocated more 
resources to R&D activities, followed by information technol-
ogy and utilities. The oil, gas, fuel, and telecommunications 
sector, with one company each, did not reach such significant 
expenditures on R&D.
Complementarily, empirical evidence was found deter-
mining that the size of the company and its performance have 
an effect on the intensity of R&D. For the size variable, the 
effect was negative, whereas for performance, the relation 
was positive.
When multiple regression analysis of data panels was 
performed, the hypothesis of the inverse relationship be-
tween regulation and the level of expenditure on R&D was 
not confirmed, as the dummy Reg did not achieve statistical 
significance. This result suggests that, contrary to the find-
ings by Rothwell (1981), strict regulation has no influence on 
investments in R&D.
In addition, we found empirical evidence that the size of 
the company and its performance have no effect on the level 
of spending on R&D. For lnSize (size variable measured by total 
assets of the company), the effect was found to be negative, 
while for lnPerform, the relationship was positive.
The ESS and TIS control variables showed no statistically 
significant relationship with the level of spending on R&D. 
Thus, empirical evidence was not found in the proposed model 
to support the belief that belonging to specific industries is a 
determinant factor for the level of spending on R&D.
Therefore, this research contributes to the theoretical 
aspect by enriching Brazilian literature with regards to invest-
ments in R&D. In a practical sense, it increases understanding of 
the relationship between economic regulation and innovation 
and enables advances in the formulation of economic policies. 
By comparing IBGE (2016) with our results, we can infer that 
it is not the regulation itself that determinates innovation 
investments, but rather the type of governmental policies 
regarding innovation. We believe that the government must 
encourage and regulate concomitant innovation, so we suggest 
that economic policy must take into account the culture of 
Brazilian organizations by sector to provide economic devel-
opment opportunities and not poorly-planned tax incentives, 
economic subsidies, or isolated incentives. 
Finally, it is imperative to point out that the findings 
of this article should not be generalized. We faced limita-
tions in respect to the sample size, because a small number 
of companies disclosed information on investments in R&D 
during the analyzed period. Moreover, the tested model used 
as the dependent variable was a particular measure of input 
in innovation. Some other metrics could have been applied.
For future research work, we recommend studying out-
put measures of R&D, such as the number of patent requests, 
and expanding this study with the use of other explanatory 
variables. It is also noteworthy that the measure of regulation 
can be improved by means of proper indicators.
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